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The Right To Competent Counsel
Sin Special Courts Martial
by Edward F. Sherman
The special court martial is the intermediate court of the Armed
Forces, with jurisdiction over any noncapital offense under the Uni.
form Code of Military Justice. Counsel in special court martial cases
need not be lawyers, and in fact few of them are in special courts
martial of the Army and the Navy. Mr. Sherman argues that the time
has come to change this practice and ensure that servicemen are always
represented by competent lawyers at such trials.
ONE OF THE traditional duties of a
commissioned officer in the American
military has been to act as counsel in
court-martial trials. In the days when
the court martial was primarily a disci-
plinary proceeding without compli-
cated legal procedures, officers without
legal training were usually capable of
performing the limited functions re-
quired of counsel. But as drumhead
justice gave way to the modern court
martial, it became more difficult for of-
ficers untrained in the law to under-
stand the legal issues involved. Realiz-
ing the inadequacy of nonlawyer coun-
sel, Congress made the requirement
in the 1951 Uniform Code of Military
Justice that counsel in general courts
martial must be lawyers.' The require-
ment, however, was not extended to
special courts martial because of the
scarcity of military lawyers, and spe-
cial courts martial today are still using
nonlawyer officers as counsel. The
practice has been condemned by
judges, attacked by legal scholars, and
challenged in both the courts and Con-
gress, but, like many a time-honored
tradition, it does not die easily.
A 1967 decision of the Court of Mil-
itary Appeals has now cast further
doubt on the practice of using nonlaw-
yers in special courts martial. In United
States v. Tempia,2 the court held that
the Miranda3  principles apply to
military interrogations of criminal
suspects, and so a serviceman must
be given the same rights during
interrogation (to be told that he
may remain silent, that anything he
says may be used against him, and
that he will be provided a lawyer
without charge upon request if he
cannot afford one) as a civilian pos-
sesses. Thus, after Tempia, illogical as
it sounds, a serviceman is entitled to
an appointed lawyer during interroga.
tion but not in his special court-martial
trial. This anomalous situation is a
good example of what happens when
constitutional standards are applied to
certain military law procedures, but
the special court-martial practice of
using nonlawyer counsel is permitted
to continue. It is an indication of the
weakness of the special court-martial
practice, both on constitutional and
policy grounds.
Constitutional Questions
The special court martial is the in-
termediate military tribunal, standing
between the general court martial in
which the accused can receive a heavy
sentence-and in which he is provided
a lawyer-and the summary court mar-
tial in which the accused is not entitled
to counsel but can receive only minor
punishments (one month's confinement
at hard labor, one month's forfeiture of
two-thirds pay, extra duties and re-
striction). 5 A special court martial
may try any noncapital offense punish-
1. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. § 864 (hereinafter referred to as
UCMJ). art. 27(b).
2. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629. 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
3. Miranda v. Arizonta, 384 U.S. 437 (1966).
4. UCMJ, art. 18.
5. UCMJ, art. 20.
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able by the Uniform Code of Military
Justice,6 but its maximum sentence is
six months' confinement at hard labor,
six months' forfeiture of two-thirds
pay, demotion and a bad conduct dis-
charge.7
When the Uniform Code was passed
in 1951, it was provided that an ac-
cused in a special court martial may
he represented by his own civilian law.
yer or by a military lawsyer of his own
selection "if reasonably available" 8 or
if he does not hire a lawyer and a mili-
tary lawyer is not provided, by an ap-
pointed nonlawyer defense counsel.9
This provision for counsel was consid-
ered more than adequate at the time
and, in fact, exceeded the right to
counsel provided in most state and fed-
eral courts. Then in 1963, the Supreme
Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright1 O
that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel as applied to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause requires that an indigent be pro-
vided legal counsel in the trial of a fel-
ony case. Courts around the country
scurried to comply with the new re-
quirement. but the military took the
position that courts martial are not
bound by these constitutional limita-
tions and made no move to provide
lawyers in special courts.
The claim that military courts are
not bound by all the limitations of the
Bill of Rights comes from the fact that
Article I. Section 8, Clause 14 of the
Constitution gives Congress the power
to "make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces". This provision has been inter.
preted over the years as establishing a
relatively autonomous system of mili.
tary law in which the due process
rights of servicemen derive not from
the Bill of Rights but from Congress
under its Article I powers. In recent
years, however, the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals has held that portions
of the Bill of Rights apply to courts
martial, 1' and the Supreme Court has
extended federal court review of
court-martial convictions to claims of
denial of constitutional rights. 12 Thus,
although there is still a question as to
the extent to which the Bill of Rights,
particularly the Sixth Amendment, ap-
plies to courts martial there is no
longer doubt that the court-martial
procedures established by Congress are
subject to constitutional limitations.
The hub constitutional issue, then, is
whether the special court-martial prac-
tice of providing nonlawyer counsel
meets the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and Fifth
Amendment due process. The Court of
Military Appeals (in Uited States v.
Culp) 13 and the Tenth Circuit (in Ken-
nedy v. Commandant) 14 have held that
it does. There was no majority opinion
in United States v. Culp, in which all
three judges concurred, but Judge Kil-
day found that due process is complied
with (although he believes the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to courts
martial), Judge Quinn found nonlaw-
yer counsel to be a reasonable compli-
ance with the Sixth Amendment and
Judge Ferguson found no violation of
the Sixth Amendment because the ac-
cused waived his right by accepting
nonlawyer counsel. The Tenth Circuit
in Kennedy v. Commandant adopted
Judge Quinn's analysis that there is
reasonable compliance with the Sixth
Amendment.
The two courts avoided Gideon by
finding that, owing to the "singular na-
ture" of the special court martial-that
is, that typically it tries military and
misdemeanor offenses, that the pro-
cedures are simplified and that the
prosecutor must not be a lawyer when
the defense counsel is not a lawyer' 5 -
nonlawyer officers can provide ade-
quate legal representation. Gideon spe-
cifically involved an indigent charged
with a felony in a civilian trial.
Whether the Gideon rationale should
6. The special court martial is the most used
military court, comprising two thirds of the
total courts martial. In fiscal year 1965, the
Army had 24,815 special courts martial, the
Navy and Marine Corps 13,174, and the Air
Force 2,057. Joint Hearings on S. 745-62, S.
2906-7, Part 3 Before the Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., at 912, 937, 963
(1966) thereinafter cited as Joint Hearings).
7. UCMJ, art. 19.
8. In practice, requests for a military lawyer
are usually refused as shown by Army testi-
mony that "requests for appointment of legal-
ly qualified counsel at a special court martal
are rarely granted in the Army because these
counsel are in fact not often reasonably avail-
able from their required duties". Joint Hear-
ings, page 912.
9. UCMJ, art. 38(b).
10. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11. United Stales v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1
C.M.R. 74 (1951), adopted the term "military
due process" to refer to those due process
rights, derived from Congress rather than the
be extended to the special court mar-
tial raises several questions: First, can
a soldier in a special court martial, no
matter how impecunious, be consid-
ered an indigent so that he is entitled
to appointed counsel? Second, is a spe-
cial court-martial offense, which can
be punished only by a maximum of six
months' confinement, comparable to a
felony, so that counsel is required?
Third, in order to comply with the
Sixth Amendment, must the appointed
counsel be a lawyer or is an officer
who has had classes in military law
sufficient?
(1) Whether a soldier qualifies as an
indigent would have to be decided on a
case-by-case basis. Most enlisted men's
pay is so low and savings so small that
they would meet the usual standards for
indigency applied in civilian courts.
However, Judge Kilday maintains in
his opinion in United States v. Culp
that members of the military can never
be indigents because they are always
guaranteed representation in a special
court martial. 16 The difficulty with this
argument is that it begs the question
by assuming that a nonlawyer counsel
actually does provide adequate legal
representation. If nonlawyer counsel is
not adequate, and a strong argumnent
can be made that no nonlawyer can
provide adequate representation, then
the serviceman is in the same position
as an indigent in a civilian court be-
fore the decision of Gideon. Each is
being deprived of adequate representa-
tion because he does not have the
money to hire a lawyer.
(2) The term "felony" usually refers
to an offense punishable by confinement
Bill of Rights, which are requisite to funda-
menal fairness and so must be provided in a
court martial. United States v. Jacoby, 11
U.S.C.M.A. 428 at 430-431, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960),
however, stated: "the protections of the Bill of
Rights, except those which are expressly or by
necessary implication inapplicable, are avail-
able to members of our armed forces". This
seems to conform with the Supreme Court's
view. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Mili-
tary, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181 (1962).
12. Federal courts were traditionally limited
to inquiring on habeas corpus whether a court
martial had jurisdiction over the person and
offense and acted within its lawful powers.
In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); Hiatt v.
Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950). Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137 (1952), extended review to in-
clude denial of due process rights which the
military had manifestly refused to consider.
13. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.IR. 411 (1963).
14. 377 F. 2d 330, rert, denied, 389 U.S. 807
(1967).
15. UCMJ, art, 27 (c) (1).
16. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 202.
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in a penitentiary for more than one
year. A majority of special courts mar-
tial involve such offenses as AWOL,
drunkenness, breaking restrictions and
destruction of government property.
These are either not civilian crimes or
would not be felonies if tried in a civil-
ian court. However, a special court has
jurisdiction to try all noncapital of-
fenses under the code, and felonious
crimes such as manslaughter, grand
larceny and aggravated assault are also
tried there. The maximum confinement
which a special court can adjudge is
only six months, but the total potential
punishments are so great (six months'
forfeiture of two-thirds pay can
amount to some $2,000 for a ranking
NCO and more for an officer, demotion
will affect both future earnings and ca-
reer, and a bad conduct discharge may
be a lifetime liability) that it is com-
parable in seriousness to a civilian fe-
lony trial.
There is also precedent to extend the
Gideon rule to nonfelonies. Two Fifth
Circuit cases involving misdemeanors
have held that counsel is constitution-
ally required, rejecting the formal dis-
tinction between felony and misde-
meanor as having little to do with the
Gideon rationale and instead relying
on such factors as the nature of the of-
fense, the extent of the possible sen-
tence and the legal complexity of the
case.17 Application of Stapley,1s a 1965
decision of the United States District
Court for Utah, offered a similar anal-
ysis. There, a 19-year-old private
charged with fraud was refused a law-
yer in a special court martial and was
represented by an appointed captain in
the Veterinary Corps who confused the
elements of a key defense and incor-
rectly advised a guilty plea on all
charges. The court found the represen-
tation inadequate and held that be-
cause the charges involved moral turpi-
tude and there was a risk of substantial
incarceration, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel applied. This type of
approach seems to be a reasonable ap-
plication of Gideon to the court martial
situation, and, under it, most special
courts martial would require legally
trained counsel.
(3) Although Gideon does not specif-
ically state that the "counsel" required
by the Sixth Amendment must be a
lawyer, the Court imputes legal profi-
ciency to counsel that could only
refer to legally trained counsel. There
was realiy no reason for the Supreme
Court to specify that it meant a lawyer
because only members of the Bar may
be admitted to practice before a civil-
ian court. Both the Culp and Kennedy
decisions, however, maintain that the
Sixth Amendment requirement of
counsel may be met by an officer who
has had classes in military law. Thus a
key element of the constitutional posi-
tion taken in Culp and Kennedy is that
nonlawyer officers have enough legal
training to provide adequate represen-
tation in the simplified special court-
martial trial.
Are Nonlawyer Counsel
Adequate?
Anyone who has had personal ex-
perience with the training in military
law given to ROTC and OCS candi-
dates and who has observed nonlawyer
officers trying special court martial
cases is likely to wonder at the judges'
faith in the legal abilities of such
officers. The fact is that the average
officer has little knowledge of military
law, and the contention that he is capa-
ble of serving in a special court martial
because it is a simpler type of trial is
an unfortune piece of logic that should
be seriously examined by the legal
profession.
The special court martial, despite
the claims that it is a simplified pro-
ceeding, purports to provide a full jury
trial, to follow the same basic judicial
procedures to insure due process as in
a general court martial, and to be
bound by legal statutes and precedents.
Complex problems of admissibility of
evidence, instructions and charges, and
interpretation of statutes and cases are
very much a part of the special court
martial. To argue that a nonlawyer,
even one who has had considerable ex-
perience in special courts martial,
brings the same expertise to such a
trial as a lawyer who has spent three
years learning the basic knowledge of
his profession is like arguing that a
medical aid man who has performed
field operations should be given a doc-
tor's license. Some nonlawyers, of
Edward F. Sherman is now a
teaching fellow at the Harvard
Law School. He served as a cap-
tain in the Military Police Corps
from 1965 to 1967 and is a mem-
ber of the Army Reserve. He is a
graduate of Georgetown Universi-
ty (A.B. 1959) and the Harvard
Law School (LL.B. 1962) and
received M.A. degrees from the
University of Texas at El Paso in
1962 and 1967. He was admitted
to the Texas Bar in 1962.
course, have performed admirably as
counsel in special courts martial. But
the fact remains that the nonlawyer, no
matter how experienced or well-inten-
tioned, has only a superficial under-
standing of the legal method, the role
of statutes and precedent, the back-
ground of legal defenses and rules of
evidence, and the concepts of constitu-
tional law. His lack of depth in the
law could mean, at a hundred differ-
ent points in the trial, that the accused
will not receive adequate representa-
tion.
Despite assurances by the military
that nonlawyers provide adequate
representation in special courts, few
persons who have been closely involved
in special courts martial have illusions
about the quality of representation. An
Army JAG captain, for example, wrote
in the Military Law Review in 1962:
Since legally trained personnel are
not required on special courts martial
17. Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (5th
Cir. 1965); McDonald v. Moore, 353 r. 2d 106
(5th Cir. 1965).
18. 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
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(even the President of the court need
not be and usually is not a lawyer), it
takes little imagination to guess the
quantity of legal errors and the quality
of fairness and justice afforded an ac-
cused before this tribunal in compari-
son with a general court martial. 19
Judge Ferguson wrote in Culp one of
the strongest denunciations of the use
of nonlawyers in special courts martial:
An officer of the armed services of
necessity cannot receive the training
required to perform adequately as
counsel for an accused. . . . To me it is
just unthinkable to conclude that the
best intentioned layman can be taught
by attendance at a few generalized lec-
tures to become a capable representa-
tive of another in a criminal pros-
ecution.20
A number of special court-martial
cases have been reversed for inade-
quate representation by nonlaw-
yers. 2 1 Many more special court-mar-
tial errors are never reviewed by an
appellate court 22 or appellate review is
severely limited because a verbatim
transcript has not been made 23 or be-
cause the record is too skimpy (as the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Judiciary Committee
has stated, "evidence or information
favorable to the accused may not be
placed in the records by a counsel who
because of his lack of legal training
does not recognize what evidence
would probably benefit the ac-
cused").24 Judge Ferguson spoke in
Culp of the frustrations of trying to re-
view a special court martial where the
defendant pleaded guilty: "How are we
to know the real truth of the matters
involved if the accused upon the advice
of a nonlawyer chooses to confess his
guilt judicially and nothing is placed
in the record to support the validity of
his plea except a formula prated from
the Manual ?" 25
It can be anticipated that with the
enlarged scope of federal labeas cor-
pus review, there will be an increase in
applications to federal courts by serv-
icemen who have been convicted in
special courts martial after being re-
fused a lawyer. The special court mar-
tial without lawyers does not have a
very successful record, and the road
ahead is even rockier. It is becoming
increasingly difficult to avoid the con-
clusion that the practice of law by non-
lawyers has not proved any more suc-
cessful in the military than it has else-
where.
A Truly Adversary
Proceeding?
Special courts martial without law-
yers frequently do not constitute a
truly adversary proceeding. Take a
typical Army special court martial. A
junior officer, often a lieutenant, will
usually be appointed defense counsel
as an additional duty in order to "give
him some court-martial experience" or
because officers of higher grade are too
busy. Upon appointment, he will be
provided the 144-page Military Justice
Handbook and the 600-page Manual
for Courts-Martial, 1951. The com-
mander is required by regulation to
"assure himself" that counsel "are cur-
rently familiar" with the Handbook,26
but this is a mere formality because of-
ficers, due to the press of other duties,
rarely devote much study to it or the
Manual. Judge Quinn wrote in Culp
that the nonlawyer officer, "with a full
knowledge of the Uniform Code and of
the procedural regulations" 27 is compe-
tent to give legal assistance, and the
Tenth Circuit in Kennedy spoke confi-
dently of the requirement that every
officer be familiar with the code and
understand the substance of military
crimes.28 The courts, unfortunately, are
indulging in sheer fantasy. Most
officers have only tie haziest notion of
what the code is all about, and if you
can find one officer in ten who has ac-
tually read fifty pages of the code, the
Manual or the Handbook you are ex-
tremely lucky.
The amount of time which a counsel
devotes to investigating and preparing
the case varies with the type of case
and the initiative of the officer, but few
will undertake the type of thorough
investigation, search for witnesses and
evidence, and legal preparation which
are standard procedures for a compe-
tent criminal lawyer. Counsel often
fails to make adequate investigation
and preparation not because of laziness
but because of lack of appreciation of
the facts, evidence, witnesses and legal
precedents he will require to present
an effective defense.
The actual special court-martial trial
runs according to the script in the
back of the Manual. The script is help-
ful to the nonlawyer participants it in-
suring that they do not forget any of
the necessary elements of the trial, but
it has the disadvantage of formalizing
what should be an adversary proceed-
ing into a static ritual. Thus, it is not
uncommon for a special court martial
to be reduced to a recitation from the
script, the president and counsel read-
ing back and forth to each other, gar-
bling the unfamiliar legal terms, mis-
takenly reading beyond their appropri-
ate sections and missing the cues for
raising objections and defenses.
A military officer, although not a
lawyer, does have the benefit of under-
standing the psychology and thought
processes of the officers on the court.
But his military attititudes may also
mitigate against his being a good de-
fense counsel. It may be difficult for
him to withstand pressures from his
commander, and he may be reluctant
to take a strongly adversary position
before a court of officers of higher
grade. Nonlawyers often equate guilt
in fact with guilt under the law and
lack the background in professional
ethics which may help a lawyer to
avoid either overzealousness or under-
zealousness. In Judge Ferguson's
words:
Laymen will never understand an at-
torney's devotion to the interests of an
19. Bednar. Discharge and Dismissat as
Punishment in the Armed Forces, 16 MIL. L.
Rv. 1, at 15 (1962).
20. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 219.
21. See United States v. Hamilton, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 117, 33 C M.R. 329 (1963). failure to
submit evidence in extenuation and mAigat o_
of accused's having made restitution; United
States v. Henn, 13 U.S.c.M.A. 124, 32 C.M R.
124 (1962), improper advice to plead gui.ty;
United States v. Gardner, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 25
C.M.R. 310 (1958), failure to move for dis-
missal for failure to make prima facie case.
22. Special courts martial are reviewed by
the convening authority, the staff judge advo-
cate, and the general court martial authority's
Judge Advocate office, and if a bad conduct
discharge is adjudged, also by a board of re-
view and in certain cases by the Court of Mil-
itary Appeals on issues of law. UCMJ, arts.
64-67.
23. A verbatim transcript is only required
if the convening authority requests it. How-
ever, a bad-conduct discharge cannot be ad-
judged without it. LUCMJ, art. 19. Reporters
may not be provided in Army special courts
martial without authority from the Secretary
of the Army, and so most Army special courts
cannot adjudge a bad conduct discharge. AR
27-145.
24. Joint Hearings, page 459.
25. 14 U.S.C.M.A at 220.
26. AR 27-12, para. 12.
27. 14 U.S.C.MA at 217,
28. 377 F. 2d at 343.
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obviously guilty client or the single-
minded loyalty to the latter's cause
which almost unexceptionally charac-
terizes the practice of law.29
It has been shown that nonlawyers
are more likely to advise the accused
to plead guilty and not to bargain for a
lesser sentence36 and are less likely to
make pretrial motions, such as for the
suppression of evidence and confes-
sions, to make timely objections to
questions and evidence and to cross-
examine witnesses. Finally, although
legal training does not insure an effec-
tive trial manner, a lawyer with some
training in advocacy is more likely to
make an effective presentation both in
the trial and prior to sentencing. All
told, the nonlawyer lacks so much
knowledge and training that the adver-
sary nature of the special court martial
is seriously threatened.
Congressional Considerations
An omnibus bill on military justice
has been under consideration by the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Judiciary Committee
since 1958. Most prior versions of the
Senate bill and similar bills offered in
the House by Congressman Bennett,
one of which was passed by the House
on June 3 of this year,31 include a
provision that a bad conduct discharge
cannot be adjudged by a special court
martial unless the accused was afforded
the opportunity to be represented at
the trial by a lawyer. However, the
Senate bill introduced last session by
Senator Ervin, Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights, re-
placed this provision with the stronger
requirement that lawyers be provided
in all special courts martial32 and Con-
gressman Gonzalez introduced a bill
with a similar provision in the House. 33
The military services have reluctantly
approved of the provision for counsel
before a bad conduct discharge can be
adjudged but are strongly opposed to
requiring lawyers in all special courts.
The provision that counsel must be
provided only when a bad conduct dis-
charge is adjudged is so watered down
that it will not substantially remedy the
present situation and, if passed, it may
blunt the impetus for reform and pre-
vent the passage of a stronger provi-
sion for years to come. It will not
apply at all to Army special courts
martial (which constitute almost two
thirds of the total military special
courts) because Army regulations do
not permit special courts to adjudge
bad conduct discharge., 4 The Air
Force already provides lawyers in all
special courts, 35 and so only the Navy
would be affected. The provision
would not apply to those Navy special
courts martial in which a bad conduct
discharge is not a possible penalty, and
the Navy could avoid the provision en-
tirely simply by not permitting its spe-
cial courts to adjudge bad conduct dis-
charges as does the Army. There are
indications, however, that the Navy
would not give up the power to ad-
judge bad conduct discharges in spe-
cial courts and so would attempt to
provide lawyers in courts where that
penalty could be given. A reform pro-
vision that has this little effect can
scarcely be said to provide a solution
to the serious problems posed by spe-
cial courts without lawyers.
The opposition of the military to
providing lawyers in special courts
martial has traditionally been based on
the philosophy that the special court
martial is a disciplinary, rather than a
judicial, proceeding and should be
controlled and administered by the
commander and his officers without un-
necessary legal formalities. However,
this "disciplinary" view has gradually
lost ground as special courts martial
have been required in recent years to
adopt most of the due process proee-
dures followed in general courts (ex-
cept for use of lawyers). Congress's
amendment of the code in 1962 to per-
mit a commander to assess greater pen-
29. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 220.
30. 1964 COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS ANN.
REP. at 85-86.
31. H.R. 15971, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
Congressman Bennett had previously intro-
duced H.R. 226 and H.R. 12705, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967).
32. S. 2009, 90th Cong., lst Sess. (1957).
33. H.R. 6555, 90th Cong., lst Sess. (1967).
34. See footnote 23,
35. Joint Hearings, page 963.
36. UCMJ, art. 15(b), as amended Septem-
ber 7, 1962.
37. In the first nine months after Article 15
was amended, there were 12,271 Army sum-
mary courts martial as compared to 41,848 for
the same period the year before. Miller, A
Long Look at Article 15, 28 MIL. L. REv. 37,
at 113 (1965). H.R. 226, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
would abolish the summary court martial.
38. REPORT o Hon. WnLnuR M. BRUCKER, SEC-
RETARY OF AMiy, BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE
alities under Article 1536 has further
hastened the progress of the special
court away from the disciplinary phi-
losophy since now that a commander
can sentence an offender to up to one
month's correctional custody (plus
fines, restrictions and demotions),
there is less need to use a court martial
to discipline offenders. As a result,
summary courts martial are used less
frequently these days,3 7 and the special
court martial, with its six-months' con-
finement power, should be made a full-
fledged judicial proceeding where an
accused can receive a fair trial and be
represented by a lawyer.
The military's primary argument
against providing lawyers in special
courts martial is that, as stated by the
Army in its amieus brief in United
States v. Culp, "there are simply not
enough lawyers to go around". The ar-
gument is based upon estimates that
the JAG Corps would have to be dou-
bled in size to provide lawyers in all
special courts martial. 38 This would
mean some 1,200 new Army JAG
officers and 600 Naval law specialists.3 9
A sudden need for twice as many mili-
tary lawyers would undoubtedly cause
administrative problems, but rapid ex-
pansion is nothing new to the military,
and there is no reason to believe the
military could not handle it. The legal
corps had to expand suddenly in
World War II when the Army JAG
Department went from 190 officers in
1941 to 2,162 in 1945, 40 and in the Ko-
rean War when 400 Army Reserve JAG
officers were called to active duty, 41 and
this could be done again. Doubling the
JAG Corps is actually less of a problem
today than in World War II or the Ko-
UCMJ, GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN THE ARMY,
January 19, 1960, at 203. Rear Admiral William
C. Mott, JAG, US Navy, estimated that up to
3,600 additional military lawyers might be
needed. Joint Hearings, page 722.
39. As of December 31, 1966, the Army had
1,164 JAG officers, the Air Force 1,286, and
the Navy 591 legal specialists. No additional
Air Force lawyers would be necessary because
the Air Force provides lawyers in all special
courts. Whenever the term "JAG Corps" is
used in this article it is intended to refer to
all three services, although Navy lawyers are
called "legal specialists" and are not in a
separate JAG Corps. S. 2009 and H.R. 226, 901h
Cong., 1st Sess. would create a Naval JAG
Corps.
40. Fratcher, History of the JAGC, US Army,
4 MIL. L. REv. 89, at 106 (1959).
41. ANN. HIsr. SUM., OFFICE OF ARMY JAG,
HIST. OF ACTIVITIES OF THE JAG OmFFcE RELATING
TO THE KOREAN CONFLICT 19.
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rean War. and Reserves should not be
needed, because there is today a large
reservoir of legal manpower-the grad-
uating law students-which can easily
be tapped for the manpower needs.
One of the ironies of the present sit-
uation is that while the military main-
tains that it cannot provide lawyers in
special courts because there aren't
enough military lawyers, thousands of
recent law school graduates are being
refused by the JAG Corps and being
taken into the military in nonlegal
jobs. There are few greater wastes in
our society than having lawyers do
nonlegal jobs while nonlawyers try spe-
cial court-martial cases. More than
15,000 law students are graduated from
law schools each year, and the Army
and Air Force JAG Schools and the
Naval Justice School are flooded with
more than ten applications for every
available space, 2 Since it is a buyer's
market, 43 JAG Corps are accepting ap-
plicants only for obligated tours of four
years or more, and the majority of un-
successful applicants are faced with
military service in a nonlegal capacity.
Many lawyers who are taken into the
military in a nonlegal position (either
as an enlisted man or with a non-JAG
commission from ROTC or OCS) nat-
urally hope that they may be able to
do some legal work in the service, or at
least be assigned as a special court
martial counsel as additional or tempo-
rary duty. They quickly find that
things aren't done that way in the mili-
tarv. The Army has taken the position
that lawyers are not used in special
courts martial, and since appointment
of a lawyer as a counsel might mean
that the other counsel and possibly the
president would also have to be law.
yers, lawyers are passed over in favor
of nonlawyers for special court-martial
counsel. The Navy has been better than
the Army in attempting, when possible,
to assign lawyers who are not legal
specialists to special court-martial
work, which partly accounts for its
providing legally trained counsel in
42.03 per cent of its special courts as
compared to only 5 per cent for the
Army. 44
It is about time that the military
stop hiding behind the legal manpower
argument and begin to do some crea-
tive thinking about how to train and
utilize recent law graduates for special
court-martial work. The lawy ers' corps
have been unduly concerned with
maintaining a high percentage of ca-
reer officers 45 and should accept the
fact that young, noncareer JAG
officers, like the young lawyers in a
D.A.'s office, are quite capable of bear-
ing the burden of the litigation work in
special courts martial.
One way to train the military law-
yers needed for special court martial
work is to enlarge the facilities of the
Army JAG School at Charlottesville,
Virginia, and the Naval Justice School
at Newport. Rhode Island, or to estab-
lish JAG training schools at other sites.
Another possibility is to give law stu-
dents military law training in conjunc-
tion with the ROTC program so that
they can be commissioned in the JAG
Corps upon graduating and passing
their bar examination. A number
of law schools now offer ROTC pro.
grams, and applications have been
stimulated by the fact that ROTC
provides a deferment for the student
to finish law school. It is short-
sighted of the military to continue
to commission these law graduates
in combat branches, and considera-
tion should be given to devising an
ROTC program which would include
training in military law (perhaps with
one or two summer's additional train-
ing) so that they could be commis-
sioned in the JAG Corps. Finally, the
military should consider establishing a
category for lawyers on active duty
whose commissions are in other
branches than JAG which would
qualify them (after taking a short mili-
tary law course or passing a qualifying
exam) to serve as special court mat-
tial counsel when appointed as an ad-
ditional or temporary duty.
The Navy has special problems. It
has testified that 10 per cent of its spe-
cial courts in 1965 were conducted at
sea on ships "which cannot afford the
luxury of carrying a law officer", while
24 per cent were conducted by "rela-
tively isolated commands" which do
not have enough case load to justify a
full-time law officer. 46 Two feasible
methods of providing lawyer counsel
for ships which cannot carry a lawyer
have been used in recent years: the es-
tablishment of "dockside courts" 47
whereby larger ships provide the
court-martial personnel and counsel for
smaller vessels, and the use of "circuit-
rider" lawyers in task forces or car-
riers who would try cases either by
going to the small craft by boat or hel-
icopter or by bringing the accused to
the large craft. Crimes committed on a
small vessel at sea will have to be tried,
as are most serious crimes now, when
the vessel reaches port or can obtain
legal support from another vessel. For
those cases where a ship or submarine
is isolated for an extended period, pro-
vision may have to be made to give the
accused his choice of a speedy trial
without a lawyer or a delayed trial
with a lawyer. The Navy will have to
work out its logistical problems, but
with some effort and additional law-
yers. it can provide lawyers in special
courts.
Conclusion
The special court-martial practice of
using nonlawyers as counsel does not
do credit to the military nor serve the
ends of justice. Judicial action to de-
clare the practice unconstitutional is
stow and uncertain, and so Congres-
sional action is especially needed if re-
form is to take place in the near fu-
ture. The manpower problem can be
solved, and, in fact, the unfortunate
misuse of the skills of many lawyers
serving in the military can be cor-
rected in the process.
42. In fiscal year 1966, there were 1,700 ap-
plications for the approximately 150 available
Army JAG spaces, ANN. HIS. SUM., OFFICE OF
ARmr JAG, fiscal year 1966, page 6.
43. It must be conceded that the current
draft situation has increased the number of
JAG applications. However, the JAG Corps
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spaces, even in the late 1950's when the draft
threat was minimal, and it appears that there
will always be law graduates who for reasons
such as desire for responsibility, experience or
travel will apply to JAG. Incentives, such as
preselection of assignments and shorter tours
(from the present four to a more reasonable
two years) may have to be adopted in peri-
ods of small drafting.
44. Joint Hearings, pages 916, 940.
45. All three services have expressed con-
cern over low JAG officer retention rate,.
Career Legal Billets Go Begging, JOURNAL or
raE ARs FORcEs, April 8, 1967, page 1. RE-
pORT TO ioN. WILus i. BscUKER, sapra note
28, at 241. noted that first lieutenants made up
40 per cent of the Army JAG Corps (1930)
and that "it is desirable that not more than
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46. Joint Hearings, page 943.
47. Ochstein, The Dockside Court: The Dock-
side Special Court-Martial of COMINLANT,
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